Copa América: An Unfair Tournament by Design?

Much of Latin America is currently in the grips of the Copa América, a very exciting tournament indeed. Yet I take great issue with two aspects relating to its format. As I will explain, the tournament’s particular format makes that some countries are awarded an unfair advantage relative to others, just because of the group they were drawn into and/or the timing of their games.

Source: quepasa.cl

The first issue is a straightforward one. In all major tournaments (e.g. FIFA World Cup) as well as national leagues, the final games in the group stage of any particular group or league are scheduled at the same time. The purpose is that no team has an undeserved advantage of knowing what its competitors did and thus of being able to know what result it would need – whereas the competitors who had to play before didn’t. 

A real-life instance that made the involved unfairness all too obvious in practice and which is part of our collective football memory occurred at the 1982 FIFA World Cup. Both West Germany and Austria were to proceed to the next round if, in their final group game, West Germany were to beat Austria 1-0. After ten minutes, the West Germans scored and both teams ran down the clock for the remaining eighty. The Disgrace of Gijón incited FIFA, in future world cups, to have the final games of each group scheduled at the same time. At the Copa América, anno 2015, CONMEBOL still seems content awarding half of the teams the potential advantage of knowing what result they will need from their final group game.

The first issue can very easily be fixed. This is quite different for the second, which is more structural and relates to the two (out of three) “best thirds” qualifying. Naturally, this implies that what happens in other groups also affects what happens in any given group. Again, the teams that will play later will have the advantage of superior information about the result they need: at the time of the final games of group A, the final games in groups B and C are still left to be played, implying uncertainty of outcome, whereas at the time of the final games in group C, the final ranking of groups B and C is already known.

So the teams in later groups know better what result they need to progress. But does this actually affect how likely they are to get it? For those who prefer numbers over reason, let’s have a look at the nine editions of the Copa América where the current “best-thirds” rule was used (i.e. since 1993) and see if there’s any differences. In case better information does not affect who progresses, we would expect, on average, to see three times the best third of each group not to have made it through. The actual results, however, show the following:

Each bar indicates for the respective groups how many (on Y-axis) out of nine times the
third of that group did not progress to the knock-out stage, due to being the "worst third"

In six out of nine editions, it was the third of group A which happened to be the worst third and thus the one not to progress. Interestingly, also, the one time the third of group C did not manage to qualify, in 2007, this was a mathematical certainty already ahead of the last matchday of group C.

So now that we are clear on what the problem is, how do we solve it? By making sure that the same number of teams from each group is to progress, so that what happens in one group does not affect how many are to progress in another (alternatively, the final games of all the groups could be scheduled at the same time, but this can be considered too much of a drawback for TV audiences). Let’s assume that Copa América wants to hold on to twelve countries playing the group stage and eight progressing, to the quarters. We could have four groups of three, with the two best of each group making it through. Downside here would be that the number of teams per group is uneven, so that in each group one team would be free on the last match day and thus continues to have more complete information. The solution would be to make two groups of six, with the best four of each group qualifying for the next stage. The first of group A would then play the fourth of group B and vice versa and the second of group A against the third of group B and vice versa. The teams that would make it to the final will have competed in eight games, one more than in the case of the World Cup. If this is considered too many, one could immediately move from the group stage to the semis instead, with only the top two qualifying, which would make even more sense. 

Is the problem of an undesirable format confined to the Copa América and CONMEBOL? Interestingly, UEFA has decided to import a similar system for the Euro Cup, starting from next year’s edition, when the number of teams participating will increase with a staggering 50%. In light of the above, it is curious that a federation that is becoming adamant about creating a level playing field through Financial Fair Play, more or less at the same time decides to start assigning arbitrary (dis)advantages to some of the teams competing in its main tournament, i.e. with now “best thirds” qualifying; with some group winners meeting teams that became second, others that ended up third; some teams that were second meeting group winners and others other seconds. Again, the solution may be simple: four groups of six teams, with either only the winner or the best two of each group progressing to the knock-out stage. That’s what I would call fair play.

Which Premier League Top Scorer Would You Like in Your Team?

As national leagues across Europe draw to a close, it is a favoured time to produce lists of top scorers. With the Premiership being the toughest and most advanced domestic league - as José Mourinho likes to remind his colleagues - the top scorers of this competition are of particular attention. Sergio Agüero inherits the golden boot from Luis Suárez, having scored 26 goals, 5 more than first contender and season revelation Harry Kane. Premiership debutants Diego Costa (20), Charlie Austin (18) and Alexis Sánchez (16) complete the top 5.

Source: dailymail.co.uk

But do these single scores tell us all we need to know? For instance, how do Agüero’s 26 goals for vice-champion Man. City compare to the 18 Charlie Austin managed to put in for bottom-of-the-table and relegated QPR? Impossible to say? Let’s give it our best shot! In this post, I will argue that if we are to choose the most useful top scorer based on a single number, the simple count measure, by which penalties count as much as field goals, calls for an adjustment. Furthermore, while people like to take single-number mental shortcuts, considering several informative “stats” in conjunction is likely to yield a much more accurate and nuanced view of top scorers’ relative performances and utility to their teams.

Why is an adjustment in light of penalties due? First and foremost, whereas scoring a field goal tends to involve a unique skill, in the case of a penalty, the reduction of a team’s conversion rate by having the second best kicker shoot the team’s penalties tends to be negligible. Having Yaya Touré as designated penalty shooter instead of Agüero is highly unlikely to make a real difference for Man. City, for instance. Second, while a field goal requires finishing as well as positioning/preparation, a penalty only involves the finishing aspect. Third, it is not uncommon for a team to "award" its best scorer and/or striker with the task of taking the spot kicks exactly to provide him with the chance to up his goal tally.

An accurate efficacy measure for scorers, so I argue, ought to take into account the above qualifying features of scoring penalties. At the same time, however, spot kicks tend to involve enhanced pressure as – in contrast to most field situations – the “norm” is for the player to score. To reflect the above particularity, then, I propose for a penalty to count half of a field goal. This year's top 5 rank would remain unchanged, though the differences become smaller – e.g. as Agüero scored 5 times from the spot kick, whereas Sánchez none.

While efficacy is key, efficiency, i.e. one’s output (i.e. goals) compared to input (i.e. time played) is also crucial. For instance, say one striker scores 20 goals over the 38 league games, playing all of them, and another striker totals 20 goals appearing in only 20 games. The latter is obviously preferable, i.e. more efficient, as he needed less playing time to score the same number of goals. This implies one could be fielding someone else in the 18 remaining games, who may again score goals. Efficiency measures come with a note of caution, though: the numbers involved have to be large enough so as not to be sensitive to small changes. In case of the Premiership top scorers, however, all scored more than 15 goals and were fielded over 2,000 minutes, implying the efficiency stat is meaningful.

The efficiency ranking, i.e. the adjusted goals (efficacy) divided by the number of minutes played over the season, multiplied by 90, leads to the following ranking of average number of penalty-adjusted goals scored per game:

Adjusted goals/90 mins represents the number of goals scored on average during 90 minutes
given the player's actual scoring rate when fielded (with converted penalties counting for half)

The efficiency numbers show important additional information: when playing, Diego Costa was the highest scorer of the lot – the difference with Agüero being less than meaningful. 

Source: dailystar.co.uk

But perhaps a lot of the credit should go to Chelsea and Man. City, respectively, for being the two highest scoring teams in the league? To see how these top scorers performed relative to their teammates, let’s indeed look at their relative efficacy, i.e. the number of adjusted goals they scored relative to the number of adjusted goals scored by their team overall. Charlie Austin then turns out to be the undisputed champion, scoring 41% of QPR’s adjusted goals, followed by Kane with 35% of Spurs’ and Agüero with 30% of the Citizens’.

Do efficacy and efficiency capture everything we’d like to know about our top scorers? The answer is "no" as scoring essentially is a means to the end goal of the team winning points. So we also want to know how many points these players’ goals actually won for their team, i.e. valuing the goals they scored by their importance. To measure importance, I propose a measure that is the average of two numbers: the first is the increment in the number of virtual points resulting from the goal. For instance, if you score the 1-0, your team’s virtual points from the game go from 1 to 3, so +2 as a direct result of the goal. The second number is the end-of-game increment in points resulting from a player’s goal(s). For instance, if you scored the 1-0 and the game finishes in 2-2, then, without your goal, your team would have had 0 points instead of 1, so the increment is 1. The overall importance of such a goal would thus be (2+1)/2 = 1.5. The maximum number of points a player can contribute in a single game is limited to 3 and penalties again count as half a field goal.

The beauty of this importance measure is twofold: First, it relates goals to points, which is what matters in the end, e.g. if you score 5 goals, it makes a big difference for your team whether you scored all in a 5-0 victory or, instead, put your team up 1-0 on five different occasions. Second, both being part of a successful (e.g. Chelsea) and a less successful (e.g. QPR) team has its advantages and disadvantages, allowing for a more levelled comparison of players’ individual contributions, irrespective of the quality of their team: as part of an unsuccessful team, it is harder to put in the goals, but when you do, it is more likely to be one that matters. The importance measure yields a clear “winner”:

Note that efficacy is expressed as number of goals;
importance as number of points won (both on Y-axis)

Harry Kane’s goals won Tottenham Hotspur a clean 24 points, no less than 7 more than did Aguëro’s goals for City. The goals of Diego Costa, our most efficient player, turn out not to have resulted in that many additional points for Chelsea: out of the 16 games he got himself on the score sheet, in 8 of those his goal(s) made a difference of less than a point. The average point contribution of Kane’s goals is 1.2, nearly double that of Diego Costa’s. After re-scaling the importance measure to account for time played - meaning allowing all top scorers as many minutes as the one who collected most, viz. Austin - Diego Costa jumps Austin and Sánchez, but Kane remains far ahead of both Diego Costa and Agüero: the PFA's Young Player of the Year's goals then yield 28.5 points; Agüero’s 20 and Diego Costa’s 18.

Will those who scored more/less important goals repeat this again next year? That, luckily, is impossible to predict. We'll have to tune in again to the Premier League next season!

Who would you choose for your team if you could only pick one? J

Xavi and Gerrard: 500 Games Each, But Worlds Apart?

It was almost 399 years after the day both Shakespeare and Cervantes passed away when Steven Gerrard and Xavi Hernández both played their 500^th league game for their respective clubs. As for these writers, although contemporaries, both players have quite distinct styles. It is not just that they are different. Gerrard is a ‘box-to-box’ player, said to be a protagonist of a game of times passed, whereas Xavi, the technical virtuoso, typifies a more modern game. In light of their distinct styles, many may appreciate linking Xavi to a literary genius; fewer in the case of Stevie G. In this post, I present a personal comparison of both jubilee celebrators and explain that a main reason why Gerrard is considered the ugly duckling of the two may be due to a matter of - bad - timing.

Source: sport.es

In his excellent book on football tactics, Universality: The Blueprint for Soccer’s New Era, Matthew Whitehouse speaks of Gerrard in terms of “the classic midfielder of the late 1990’s”, which faded away with the advent of the 2000’s. Xavi, on the other hand, is labelled “a technician, ideally suited to the contemporary game and its needs” and “the best midfielder of his generation”. These views also seem reflected in the way both clubs are currently treating their veterans: whereas Barça President Bartomeu told Xavi he has earned himself the right to decide whether and how long to remain at the club, Gerrard was made to understand it was time for him to leave Liverpool FC. Xavi’s place in football stardom is definitely well deserved. But is Gerrard’s in the periphery really granted?

Both Xavi and Gerrard started their club careers at the end of the previous millennium and, since, have turned into icons of their respective clubs. The highlight in both players’ club careers has been winning a Champions League and receiving the man-of-the match award for their individual performance in the final. Both respective games could hardly have been more telling of both protagonists. In 2005, Gerrard saw his team 3-0 behind at half time in the CL final against AC Milan. After scoring the 3-1 with a rare, thumping header, the captain windmilled his arms, urging the Reds’ fans this one wasn’t over till it was over. The rest went into history as the 'miracle of Istanbul' and ended with Gerrard lifting the trophy. Four years later, FC Barcelona would beat Man. U. 2-0, with Xavi demonstrating his sublime skill throughout the game and presenting Messi the second goal with an inch-perfect assist.

Fighting spirit vs. a touch of class. In contemporary football the former seems to have lost its appeal, in favour of the latter. In the case of Gerrard and Xavi, is it fair to say the latter is really superior, in terms of efficacy? Although goals and assists, admittedly, only tell a partial story, comparing both players on this basis seems informative, for two reasons. First, both played 500 league games, a large enough number to rule out most randomness and coincidence. Second, both are midfielders whose team contribution lies primarily in the build-up of the attack and setting up goals.

Comparing both players' vital stats, it can be noted that, in 500 league matches, Gerrard scored 117 goals; Xavi 56. Let’s have Gerrard’s 32 penalty goals count only for half, adjusting the statistic to 101 goals. Xavi is the king of assists, with 110; Gerrard has 68. That makes a total of 169 goals + assists for Gerrard vs. 166 for Xavi. Moreover, as over the period in which Gerrard and Xavi were active, the average number of goals in a Premier-League game is 2.64 as compared to 2.68 in a Liga game, a goal/assist in the Premier League seems even slightly more difficult/decisive. The vital stats, thus, do not seem to bear out the difference in relative superiority typically perceived in both players. Then why this perception?

In addition to the outspoken differences in success with their respective national teams – only Xavi was part of a golden generation – a major explanatory factor is that the world seemed to be ready and waiting for the Xavi-type of player, while it was, at the same time, tired of and not yet ready for Gerrard. Together with contemporaries such as Iniesta, Messi and David Silva, Xavi defied the obtain logic that there was no space at the front stage of world football for small and frail technicians. Shortly after the “rise of the little man”, as Whitehouse calls it, however, they seemed to dominate world football, through both FC Barcelona and Spain. General appreciation for the novelty of this type of player and his flair are evident in the FIFA Ballon d’Ôr’s nominations: Messi has been on the stage during all five ceremonies, Xavi and Iniesta both twice. Xavi became one of the billboards of a new type of football – tiki-taka – featuring an exciting new type of player.

Gerrard is much less atypical – tall and athletic, with physical prowess, power and endurance being his key attributes. He was often considered too old-school, not refined enough for the modern game. Although most popular in the traditional English game, the ‘box-to-box’ player seems much less vital in newly emerging formations, notably the 4-2-3-1. During the 2005/2006 season, then-Liverpool manager Benitez considered Gerrard not tactically disciplined enough to be at the centre of the field as he “wanted to do everything himself” and preferred to play his captain wide or as support striker. Stevie G did not let it get to his heart and scored 23 goals in all competitions that season.

Coaches have been playing the Liverpool skipper in a range of positions: defensive midfielder, central midfielder, number 10, support striker, winger and right midfielder. Gerrard's versatility, then, seems to resonate with the “universal player” of the imminent future, which Whitehouse speaks of, i.e. the type of player who excels in many different positions and formations, allowing for fluidity of play and tactics, even in a single game, personified by Philip Lahm. In this sense, Gerrard probably came to the stage too early. 

In contrast, Xavi, who played in just one position, viz. central midfield, made his career at the same time that the type of football he was playing flourished, a possession-based type of play summed up by Xavi's statement that "if you are not going to pass the ball then why play the game?", which, today, not even Barça or Guardiola’s Bayern are attempting to perform anymore. Obviously, Xavi was not just lucky with this; he contributed to the success of his type of football. For Gerrard, it has always rather been an uphill battle: too late as a ‘box-to-box’; a universal type of player avant-la-lettre.

In spite of this, comparing their vital league stats at their respective clubs, Gerrard does not seem to have to shy away from Xavi’s. But, as Xavi accurately notes, “in football, the result is an imposter. There’s something greater than the result, more lasting – a legacy”. And to leave a legacy, it helps being a child of your time.

Third-Party Ownership for Dummies – So What Is the Problem, Really?

UEFA recently started creating a big fuss about Third-Party Ownership (TPO), depicting it as a major potential threat to professional football. I will explain briefly what TPO is about and summarize three main reasons why it can indeed be considered hazardous to the integrity of the game.

What is TPO?

Typically, when a player is transferred from one team (“team A”) to another (“team B”), the acquiring team (B) pays a transfer fee to the selling team (A), entitling the acquiring team (B) to the “ownership rights” of the player. Concretely, this means that if team B was to sell the player again later on, team B, in turn, would be netting a transfer fee for the player – ideally, one larger than what was previously paid to team A, so as to make a net profit.

In case of TPO, it is no longer a transaction involving only - or even mainly - the clubs; rather, an athlete’s “ownership rights” are in the hands of a third-party owner, which has invested in the athlete under the assumption a substantial amount of future transfer fees can be generated out of him/her. So in case a player, whose “ownership rights” are in the hands of a third-party owner (“C”), is being transferred to a team B, the transfer fee team B is paying will be cashed in by C, with team A being left empty-handed (assuming, for simplicity, the player is 100% third-party owned).

The threats of TPO to the integrity of the game

At first sight, it may seem as if TPO merely implies a player can cash in earlier on his/her future potential, handing on the risk to a third party. At closer inspection, however, the game of football risks to suffer greatly from TPO, mainly for the following reasons:
                                                       

1.       Third-party owner C will receive a return upon its investment if and only if the player is being transferred. Each time the player moves teams, C will be passing by the cash register, implying C's goal will be to have the player move teams as often as possible.
                                                        

2.       An even more serious problem concerns “conflict of interests” as TPO threatens to fundamentally alter the relationship between an athlete and his/her agent, substantially increasing the power of agents. Let me illustrate this by means of an example. In a system without TPO, the power, even of a “superagent” such as Jorge Mendes, largely resides in his/her network and is thus informal. Ultimately, the agent is hired by the athlete, to take care of those aspects the athlete would like to entrust the agent with. José Mourinho, for instance, employs Jorge Mendes to take care of Mourinho’s business for him. 

Source: 101greatgoals.com

A potential – but not yet material – conflict of interest arises when Mendes is also representing some players belonging to Mourinho’s team – in this case Chelsea – but not others. After all, the agent has an interest only in those athletes in his/her “portfolio”. Mendes, thus, may encourage Mourinho to pay particular attention to those players when it comes to giving them playing time.

The reason why this potential conflict of interest does not need to materialize is because the agent is in a subordinate position to the athlete.The athlete can easily hire and fire his/her agent. So Mourinho's interests will be Mendes's; Mendes's interests won't necessarily be Mourinho's.

This dynamic between athlete and agent stands to change fundamentally as a result of TPO. In the case of Mourinho, his “ownership rights” are in the hands of a third-party investor, in which superagent Mendes happens to have a major stake. So no longer is Mendes merely “hired” by Mourinho, Mendes now actually “owns” Mourinho, let it be indirectly. Such a structure may make any request by the agent potentially much more persuasive: Mendes's interests will now also be Mourinho's. In economic terms, TPO thus risks reversing the "principal-agent" relationship: whereas without TPO, Mendes would be Mourinho's agent, with TPO, Mourinho stands to become a pawn in the portfolio owned by Mendes.

                                                                      

Mourinho-Mendes relationship in a world without (left) and with (right) TPO

The fact that we currently are still living in a world with TPO may not be alien to why, e.g. the Belgian football press prophesied an even brighter future for Chelsea's Charly Musonda Jr. as he recently dumped his former agent for…Jorge Mendes.

Source: voetbalspot.be

3.       Another real threat posed by TPO again relates to clubs and coaches losing out control to agents and parties who are in it for the money. Third-party owners may offer their players to teams, which normally would not be able to afford the transfer fee, in return for certain conditions, e.g. that they will always be fielded. In the short term, this essentially implies the manager having to cede team decision-making to business interests. In the longer term, it also exposes the club to the danger of being substantially weakened as it is to receive no compensation, i.e. transfer fee, when the “star player” moves on and, thus, without means to find a suitable replacement.

While not directly related to TPO, the case of (former) Chelsea loanee Thorgan Hazard to Belgian Zulte-Waregem serves to illustrate both mentioned aspects. First, Hazard's entourage negotiated that their poulain would have to be awarded the captain's band, confronting coach Dury with a foregone conclusion and upsetting the dressing room. Second, while, under impulse of Hazard, Zulte-Waregem peaked to become vice-champion, after the golden boot had left - without receiving any compensation - the club quickly found itself fighting relegation (admittedly, other key players had left the club as well). Whereas fans may prefer such peaks and troughs, Zulte-Waregem's stability and balance, arguably, did not seem to have fared well by the Hazard saga.

Rather than claiming that, say, Mourinho, will necessarily give in to any demands by his agent, with or without TPO, I have sought to illustrate how TPO stands to change relative power and the incentive structure involved. While UEFA may have its own rationale for strongly opposing TPO, my intention has been to summarize the main reasons why, from a long-term perspective of the good of the game, it's recommendable putting up a fight.

"Mineirazo": When the Tactical Meet the Coaching Mistakes

Many of us are yet to fully comprehend Brazil’s 1-7 semi-final elimination against Germany at last summer’s World Cup they hosted. Alternative explanations are abound, e.g. Zico's on FIFA's website. As I am yet to come across a “satisfactory” one, I will share mine.

As the case for many historic disasters, in entirely different spheres, I argue that the Mineirazo can be put down to a combination of tactical failings and inadequate organisational culture. As football psychology coach Dan Abrahams puts it in his book Soccer Brain, “[w]hilst the odd tactical mistake can happen it is primarily mindset and coaching culture that…spark[] great games, champagne moments… It is mindset and coaching that can, conversely, generate poor performances, nightmare matches…”

The coaching mistake

As I was on the plane destination Mineirão – an omen perhaps? – for Belgium’s first group game, I was startled when watching the on-board pre-World Cup reportages featuring interviews with the Brazilian players. The message of the twenty-something-year olds was univocal and boiled down to this: ‘Mark our words, people of Brazil, we are going to make up for the maracanazo, set history right and bring the World Cup home. We are the chosen generation of players to make this happen.’ This youthful optimism reflected just how eager they were to bring joy to their people. The one to protect the overenthusiastic youngsters from inviting unreasonable pressure onto themselves, however, and to canalize this positivism into a winning mindset, tactical discipline and focus on a common goal was the coach. As for the coach, as Abrahams puts it, “Optimism, yes – ignorance, no!”

It seemed, though, that Scolari took little decisive action to prevent his youthful team’s optimism turn into ignorance. This was manifested in two different ways. First, for a coach to cultivate a winning mindset amongst his players should not be confounded with not having contingency plans for when things don't go that smoothly. Rather than believing they are too good to fall behind, players should have the conviction that even if one or two goals down, they are going to bring this game home and how to make that happen.

In Abrahams’s words: “The champion…doesn’t allow herself to become engulfed in emotion as she competes.” If this is what marks the champion, then Brazil clearly was not one: after conceding a first and second goal against Germany, it was clear from the players’ collective (non-)reaction they had never given it any serious thought what to do in case this situation would arise. With the third goal came the realization that the World Cup for them was over and that they were not going to deliver upon their promise. No longer were they professional football players who would see this game out with minimal damage, they all just wished they were somewhere else and it seemed most of them already were.

Source: lanacion.cl

Imperatively, there had already been a clear warning the Seleção were not in control of their emotions as players broke into tears before taking a penalty kick in the shootout concluding their second-round game against Chile. Following such a clear mental breakdown of players during a game in which Brazil flirted more than once with elimination, one would expect a psychologically seasoned leader such a Scolari to mentally prepare his troops for a scenario different from raising the trophy Bellini-style on July 13^th – even if only to raise the chances that the latter actually would happen. And, although the eventual win against Chile may have put sand into their eyes, after Neymar’s injury, reality should have kicked in that World Cup victory would not come as a walk in the park.

Second, it is important to realize that in a short tournament, as opposed to a league, luck and elements such as a refereeing decision, an injury or suspension may have a huge impact. Most favourites appreciate that it therefore has little sense to claim they are going to win the competition, but rather that they stand a good chance of getting far in the tournament. Not the Brazilians. They were sure to win, which reflects neither an accurate understanding of the opposition, nor of the structure of the competition. One can point to the absence of Neymar and Thiago Silva in their semi-final game, but it is exactly such factors – which are far from uncommon – that, over a run of a maximum of seven games, can prove decisive and, again, something for which one ought to have a contingency plan.

The (two main) tactical errors

In all honesty, before the start, I expected Brazil’s poacher Fred would come out as one of the tournament's top scorers. After five games, however, his main “contribution” had been to steal a penalty in the very first game. His nickname “o Cone” (the cone) may perhaps show too little appreciation for his main role of permanently attracting defender attention onto himself, thus creating space for Neymar. Now, with Neymar out due to injury, however, there was no-one for Fred to attract attention away from. Rather, he would have to create the danger himself, something he had shown to be utterly incapable of during the previous games. Still, although Fred’s role had become obsolete following Neymar’s injury, Felipão surprised by yet again having a spot for “o Cone” in his starting line-up.

In addition, fielding only two centre-backs in combination with very attacking wing-backs implied little defensive security, especially against an opponent of the likes of the Nationalmannschaft. The defensive formation was particularly risky considering it was untested and ad hoc, in response to Thiago Silva’s absence. Naturally, the wing-backs could have realized, at least at some point, they had better provide more defensive support to their two central-defensive colleagues who were all too often left drowning.

Is it really fair to blame the coaches then? After all, we all know how these Brazilians are: they see a ball and all they can think about is performing a samba-like jogo bonito. Was such tactical indiscipline really characteristic, though, of Oscar, Willian, David Luiz and Ramires under Mourinho; Dante under Guardiola; Hulk under Villas-Boas; Fernandinho under Pellegrini; Marcelo under Ancelotti; Paulinho under Sherwood; Thiago Silva and Maxwell under Blanc? These are world class players who, when playing for their clubs, hardly resemble the headless Brazilian chicken European romanticists may fantasize about. Oscar, for instance, is considered to have become one of the trequartistas who works hardest for his team you may find in the game – under Mourinho.

Source: dailymail.co.uk

The combination of tactical and coaching errors leading to the Mineirazo is all the more surprising as the CBF had intentionally sought to combine tactical savvy (Parreira) with motivational knowhow (Scolari). Brazil’s most cardinal sin then perhaps was to categorically cling on to domestic coaches. With the game evolving rapidly, it would indeed appear that opening up to other ideas is a necessary requirement to stay competitive in the global arena. A piece of anecdotal evidence may be that an English coach is yet to win a Premier League title. Another, that Sir Alex Ferguson is believed to have made his career sustainable in part by having embraced evolutions in mainland European football by hiring Portuguese Carlos Queiroz as his assistant. Indeed, it is not so much about the coaches' nationality per se, but, in Abrahams’ terms, about their mindset and coaching culture.

A Game of Football: Trial of Strength or Mind-Game?

In earlier posts, I took on both Brendan Rodgers and Louis van Gaal; the former for failing to appreciate the psychological aspect of the game, the latter for getting it quite wrong. Belgian football’s clásico announced itself as a good test for the importance of the mental element of the game, if any. Steven Defour was to return to Standard’s Sclessin, the stadium he had left for Porto, back in 2011, with Anderlecht, Standard's nemesis. The Rouches had made it very clear in the build-up to the game that their former captain would be in for a warm welcome back. The Belgian international had informed the media he had prepared himself for the worst and kept it to himself how he would celebrate scoring a possible goal for his new employer at his former ground.

Source: voetbalbelgie.be

Defour was welcomed into the stadium with an enormous banner showing his chopped-off head dangling from his killer’s hand. As in most countries, also according to Belgian law death threats tend to be considered a serious offense, but football folklore as well as on-the-pitch proceedings at times appear to be exempt from the general rules - and more so in the South of the country. How did Defour react? Did he remain stoic under the “folkloristic” death threat? Was he to score and, if so, would he celebrate?

Top behavioural economist Uri Gneezy, together with Alex Imas, in a recent paper titled Materazzi Effect and the Strategic Use of Anger in Competitive Interactions, studied the effects of angering a player in different types of games. They conducted two separate experiments: one concerned a game of strength; the other a mind-game. In both cases, the scientists established what the effect would be of a player angering his opponent. They found that in the case of the game of strength, the angered opponent was able to put his anger to a productive use, transforming it into more strength. In the mind-game, in contrast, the provoked player saw this anger interfere with his judicious decision-making, “losing his cool”, ultimately to the detriment of his performance. Angering one's opponent in a game of strength, thus, would be counterproductive, whereas in a mind-game it pays.

In the spirit of Gneezy and Imas’s study, the Belgian clásico provided an exceptional testing ground to see whether football is mainly a trial of strength, or whether the mental aspect may actually dominate - obviously assuming both sides are at a high and comparable skill level. If Defour was to shine, the enmity against him would seem to have boosted him, in line with the depiction of football as a trial of strength. Should he give in to the acrimony, that would be anecdotal evidence rather for the football-as-mind-game conception.

So what happened? During the first half, Defour got booked for kicking the ball high and ostentatiously into the stands, after the referee had blown his whistle for a hand-ball. In the second half, when a Standard player was down and in some need of attention, Defour put the ball out of play by aiming it fiercely straight into the home crowd - moreover, after the referee had blown his whistle. The referee had no other choice but to book Defour again for an “unforced error” very similar to the one he had committed in the first half. It took quite some minutes before Defour was actually ready to leave the pitch.

Source: voetbal24.be

From a single-case study perspective, Defour’s self-inflicted sending off would appear to point to the provocation having had quite the intended “losing one’s cool” effect rather than none or even a boosting effect. Recalling Gneezy and Imas’s study, this would be anecdotal evidence towards football primarily being a mental battle: “Our results suggest that anger affected performance differently depending on the game…: anger had a positive effect on performance when the game involved strength and a negative effect when the game was more mental.” (emphasis added)

Finally, I would like to focus on the (potential) role of the coach. Anderlecht’s Besnik Hasi recently won the award for best manager in the league, after having made Anderlecht league champion last season, out of an almost lost position. Furthermore, his players, particularly the younger ones, seem to be most fond of him and to confide in his ability to make them better. His weakness, however, seems to be his lack of control on their behaviours, aggravated by an unwillingness or inability to reprimand them. The former is demonstrated by Anderlecht players repeatedly having been quarreling with each other on the pitch over who was to take a penalty or free-kick and eventually the goal-keeping captain having to cross the field to bring the internal dispute to a conclusion. The latter was evidenced recently when Anderlecht's enfant terrible Mitrovic first shoved in the back and then nastily elbowed an opponent. When confronted with the unambiguous images after the game, Hasi, puzzlingly, declared Mitrovic “clearly had not touched his opponent”.

Next to the above-mentioned main effect, scientists Gneezy and Imas also found in their experiments that “[t]hese behavioral effects were mitigated, however, when individuals had an opportunity to cool off before competing” – with a cool-down period of a mere ten minutes sufficing in their experiments. The half-time break could then have been a chance for Defour to cool down and avoid getting a second booking. Valuable time also for a coach to bring him to his senses – and, if unable to to so, to protect the player against himself by substituting him. Defour appeared not in control of his emotions also going into the second half, however, got himself sent off at 0-0 and saw his employer suffer a painful 2-0 defeat.

As the legendary Rinus Michels said, “voetbal is oorlog”. Football is war. Those generals who treat that war as primarily being about physical strength should not be surprised to continue to see their best men raging ahead toward their own deaths.

Forever Junior

Source: standaard.be

The occasion of this blog's thirteenth post could not have been more unfortunate. The Belgian U21 team has lost its 20-year-old captain. 

The November '14 friendly against Norway, in which he scored the fourth and final Belgian goal, will have been Junior Malanda's last for Belgium.

Belgian football loses its beating heart for the future. Let us hope it can preserve Junior Malanda's spirit of enjoying the game for the sake of the game.